The earliest thinking about lightness assumed that perceptual experience correlates with local stimulation. Wallach's (1948) celebrated disk/annulus experiments showed that lightness depends on relative luminance, not absolute luminance, but his ratio theory recognized perceptual structure in only a minimal way. Work following the cognitive revolution showed that lightness depends on (1) depth perception, (2) the classification of illumination edges and reflectance edges, and (3) the integration of multiple edge ratios to compute remote ratios. The role of perceptual structure has been featured in two kinds of theories: decomposition models and framework models. Decomposition models, invoking the logic of inverse optics, seek to decompose the retinal image into those separate factors, like reflectance and illumination, from which the image is initially synthesized. Framework models seek to organize the retinal image into frameworks, or perceptual groups, that represent regions of common illumination. This kind of grouping is different from, indeed orthogonal to, the more familiar kind of grouping for object segmentation. Framework theorists claim it can explain lightness illusions as well as lightness constancy. Virtually all of these advances, made since Wallach's paper, were anticipated by the Gestalt Theorists.
Lightness
Lightness refers to the perceived white/gray/black dimension of a surface. The physical property that corresponds to lightness is reflectance, that is, the percentage of light a surface reflects. White surfaces reflect about 90% of the light they receive while black surfaces reflect only about 3%. Thus lightness refers to the perception of a concrete property of an object. (Lightness should not be confused with brightness, which concerns perception of the raw intensity of light reflected by the object, which is not a property of the object itself.)
Early structure-blind conceptions
The indispensable role of perceptual organization for a theory of lightness, as with other perceptual qualities, was not recognized initially. This is not surprising. If white reflects more light to the eye than black, and if the retina contains photoreceptors that respond in proportion to the intensity of light striking them, what is the problem? Early theories of perception, as seen in the doctrine of sensations, assumed that the perceptual experience at any point in the visual field corresponds to the local stimulation at that point. This is the quintessential example of what Gilchrist (2006) has called a structure-blind approach. The Gestaltists criticized this kind of reductionist assumption. They labeled it the constancy hypothesis because it assumed a constant relationship between local stimulation and local percept. "In its consistent form", Koffka wrote (1935, p. 96) , "the constancy hypothesis treats of sensations, each aroused by the local stimulation of one retinal point. Thus the constancy hypothesis maintains that the result of a local stimulation is constant, provided that the physiological condition of the stimulated receptor is constant (e.g., adaptation)." Unfortunately the term constancy hypothesis has become confusing because in the intervening years the term constancy has come to be used in an almost opposite way. This linguistic confusion is unfortunate because the assumption of a one-to-one relationship between stimulation and experience, while wrong, is an important concept that is badly in need of a name. For example, it might be called the doctrine of local determination.
Even though no one would defend such a reductionist assumption today, Gilchrist (1994, p. 17) argues that it continues to lurk just beneath the surface, especially in lightness perception, where he has called it the photometer metaphor.
The ambiguity of luminance
The photometer metaphor fails because any shade of gray can reflect any intensity of light (called luminance). This state of affairs arises from the fact that the luminance reaching the eye from a surface is a joint product of both the reflectance of the surface and the intensity of illumination striking the surface. For example, a black surface in sunlight can easily reflect more light than a white surface in shadow. Indeed, any luminance can come from any shade of gray. This implies that the light reflected from a surface to your eye, by itself, cannot reveal the reflectance of that surface. In principle lightness can only be determined using the surrounding context. The exact role of context is the focus of many theoretical disputes. But the indispensable role of perceptual structure cannot be doubted.
The central problem of lightness is that of lightness constancy. The perceived lightness of an object remains approximately (but not entirely) constant even when the illumination level changes. In view of the spoiling role played by variations in illumination, von Helmholtz (1866 Helmholtz ( /1924 logically suggested that lightness could be recovered by dividing the luminance of a surface by an unconscious estimate of its incident illumination. But without a clear idea of how illumination can be estimated, his suggestion remains little more than a promissory note.
The appeal to relative luminance
A more concrete approach is contained in the intuitive idea that lightness depends on relative luminance, not absolute luminance. The dependence of lightness on relative luminance is a fundamental fact. Indeed, the perception of a surface in the first place requires the simultaneous, adjacent presence of at least two luminance values. If you stand in the center of a large sphere of homogeneous pigment, you cannot even see the surface. You experience only an infinite fog (Metzger, 1930; Gelb, 1932) . The perception of a surface requires at least one edge or luminance boundary.
The physical definition of reflectance involves a comparison -between the amount of light incident upon a surface and the amount the surface reflects. Thus it is not surprising that von Helmholtz as a physicist assumed that the visual system must estimate the illumination level, and compare this to the luminance of a surface. But there is a very different way to compute something like reflectance, and that is to compare the amount of light reflected by one surface with the amount reflected by neighboring surfaces. The Helmholtzian approach is very demanding computationally. It has never been clear how the illumination level could be estimated. Comparing the luminance values of neighboring surfaces, however, seems much more tractable.
Wallach experiment
In 1948 Hans Wallach published an elegant experiment that soon became a classic. He presented a disk of homogeneous luminance surrounded by a fat annulus also of homogenous luminance. Holding the luminance of the disk constant, he showed that it could nevertheless be made to appear as any shade of gray between black and white simply by varying the luminance of the annulus. He then presented observers with two disk/annulus displays and asked them to adjust the luminance of one disk to make it appear as the same shade of gray as the other disk. The settings made by the observers showed that the disks appear as equal shades of gray not when they have the same luminance value, but when the disk/annulus luminance ratios are equal. This finding led Wallach to propose the simple idea that the lightness of an object is a direct function of the ratio between the luminance of the object and the luminance of its adjacent region.
Explains constancy
Wallach's paper was celebrated for several reasons. First, when the illumination level changes, although the luminance of an object changes, the luminance ratio between the object and its immediate background does not. Wallach noted that this is exactly what would be expected if lightness were a function of the object/surround luminance ratio.
Explains simultaneous contrast
Second, the ratio idea seemed to explain another lightness puzzle, called simultaneous lightness constancy. In this classic illusion, a gray square centered on a black background appears somewhat lighter than an identical gray square on an adjacent white background. Wallach argued that this is because the two squares have different luminance ratios.
Supporting evidence
Wallach's results were consistent with Weber's law, and indeed with a great deal of evidence from various senses of a logarithmic relationship between physical energy and perceived magnitude. Later findings from stabilized images and physiological work implied that the luminance ratio at each edge is just what is encoded at the retina (Barlow & Levick, 1969; Troy & Enroth-Cugell, 1993; Whittle & Challands, 1969) .
Consistent with lateral inhibition
Finally, Wallach's ratio theory seemed to mesh perfectly with a then-recently discovered physiological mechanism called lateral inhibition. First proposed in 1865 by Ernst Mach, and later by Ewald Hering (1874), who called it "reciprocal action in the somatic visual field", experiments on the horseshoe crab (limulus) had shown that the rate of firing of a constantlyilluminated photoreceptor in the crab's eye is reduced when the light shining on neighboring receptors is increased (Hartline, Wagner, & Ratliff, 1956) . The parallel between this finding and Wallach's psychophysical results was obvious, and most researchers concluded that Wallach's ratio results were a manifestation of lateral inhibition. This was an exciting development, potentially marking the first time a basic perceptual property could be explained at the cellular level.
Limitations of ratio theory
Luminance ratios at edges have continued to play an essential role in subsequent theories of lightness. But work published since the Wallach experiment has shown that his simple ratio idea (1) does not explain lightness constancy, (2) does not explain simultaneous contrast and (3) is not explained by lateral inhibition. Indeed, these same points had been made earlier, both theoretically and empirically, by the Gestaltists. The basic problem is that the ratio principle captures the structure of the visual field in only the most minimal way. Compared to the view that sensory experience is locally determined, the ratio principle is a step in the right direction. But the response of the visual system to the structure of the image is far more extensive than Wallach imagined. Although Wallach himself (1963) did not believe that his results were explained by lateral inhibition at the retina, most other theorists did (Jameson & Hurvich, 1964; Cornsweet, 1970) . This is not surprising, especially given the retinotopic nature of Wallach's ratio concept, which implies that lightness does not depend on the 3D structure of the visual field, an unlikely position for a student of the Gestaltists. But this point was not essential to Wallach's thinking; it merely came from his empirical finding that the lightness of a disk does not change when the disk and annulus are separated in depth. But for the contrast theorists who attributed lightness to lateral inhibition, any finding that lightness depends on perceived depth would represent a fundamental challenge. Von Helmholtz's claim that lightness depends on taking the illumination into account implies a close depth/lightness linkage, but empirical support was scarce. Mach (1922 Mach ( /1959 had observed that if a white card is folded in half, placed on a table like a tent or roof, and illuminated primarily from one side, both sides of the roof appeared white, though one side appeared shadowed. However, when the card can be perceptually reversed so that it appears concave, as an open book, then "the light and the shade stand out as if painted thereon." The lightness of the shadowed side changes even though the retinal image (and with it any inhibitory effect) has remained constant.
Lightness and 3D structure
However, attempts to capture Mach's depth effect in the lab showed little or no success (Hochberg & Beck, 1954; Epstein, 1961; Flock & Freedberg, 1970; Beck, 1965) . Experiments by Gilchrist (1977 Gilchrist ( , 1980 , using a greater luminance range, and a richer context that allowed the target to form a different luminance ratio in each of two perceived spatial positions, showed that a change in depth could cause the lightness of a target surface to change almost from one end of the black/white scale to the other, with no essential change in the retinal image.
Once again, however, we see that these findings were anticipated by the Gestaltists, who clearly sketched an intimate relationship between depth and lightness. Koffka (1935, p. 246) had emphasized the importance of coplanarity. After noting that lightness is a product of luminance ratios between image patches that belong together, he wrote, "Which field parts belong together, and how strong the degree of this belonging together is, depends upon factors of space organization. Clearly, two parts at the same apparent distance will, ceteris paribus, belong more closely together than field parts organized in different planes." Gelb (1932) , Wolff (1933) and Kardos (1934) had all demonstrated an effect of depth on lightness. Radonjid, Todorovid, and Gilchrist (2010) replicated one of the Kardos experiments and found that a change in perceived depth changed the perceived lightness of a target disk by 4.4 Munsell steps, with no change in the retinal image.
The idea that lightness crucially depends on the perceived 3D structure of the visual field is by now firmly established. Empirical findings supporting a strong dependence of lightness on perceived depth have been reported by Schirillo et al (1990) , Adelson (1993 Adelson ( , 2000 , Knill and Kersten (1991) , Logvinenko and Menshikova (1994) , Spehar et al (1995) , Taya et al (1995) , Pessoa et al (1996) , and others.
Different kinds of edges: Reflectance vs illuminance edges
Wallach's suggestion that the luminance ratio at an edge in the image remains constant under a change in illumination level presupposes that all the edges in the image are reflectance edges. But of course they are not. If everything in a scene were painted the same homogeneous shade of gray, the scene would not disappear. Many visible edges would remain, but these would all be illumination edges (Gilchrist & Jacobsen, 1984) . These would include cast edges at the boundaries of cast shadows, attached edges at corners and at occlusion boundaries. When the illumination level changes, the luminance ratio at these illumination edges often changes.
How could Wallach have neglected the ubiquity of illumination edges? I believe there is a historical answer. The problem of lightness constancy manifests itself both temporally and spatially. That is, the illumination level in the world varies both over time and over space. From the beginning of research on lightness, investigation was focused on the temporal version of the constancy problem. The spatial version of the problem was, with a few exceptions, ignored, as can easily be seen in the theories. All three of Hering's physiological factors invoked to account for constancy ignore the problem of spatial illumination edges. Pupil size may be relevant to an overall shift in illumination level but is hardly helpful when viewing a complex scene with multiple regions of light and shadow. The same can be said for adaptation of the photoreceptors. As for "reciprocal interaction in the somatic visual field", later called lateral inhibition, when two identically gray papers lie under different illuminations, they produce different neural excitations at the retina. Hering argued that the neural exaggeration of the difference at each the edge between each gray paper and its background (a reflectance boundary) can mitigate that difference (Hering, 1874 (Hering, /1964 . But he failed to recognize that if the difference in excitation on the two sides of an illumination boundary (cast across a surface of homogeneous reflectance) is exaggerated, the problem of bringing neural excitation levels into line with perceived lightness levels is made worse, not better. Hering was not stupid. We must conclude that he simply did not consider the implications for lightness constancy of applying lateral inhibition to an illumination boundary.
Von Helmholtz (1866 Helmholtz ( /1924 , Hering (1874 /1964 ), and Katz (1935 ) all suggested that perceived illumination level was determined by the average luminance in the scene. This suggestion makes sense only if you are thinking about a change of illumination (over the whole scene) from time 1 to time 2. It makes no sense when a scene is divided into two adjacent regions of high and low illumination. It is ironic that Katz also fell into this trap, given that the method of asymmetrical matching he used so extensively in his early studies of lightness constancy featured exactly this spatial version of the constancy problem: side-by-side regions of illumination and shadow.
In this sense, Wallach took a very traditional approach. And this neglect of illumination edges is very natural. In one study, Kardos (1934) asked his subjects to describe the entire laboratory scene. They faithfully described the room and all its contents, but did not spontaneously mention any of the shadows. When he asked them whether they see any shadows they replied that yes, of course they see the shadows, but they had not thought to mention them. This makes some sense. While reflectance is an intrinsic property of a surface or object, the level of illumination on it is not. Likewise, in spatial perception, the size of an object is an essential property, but its distance from the observer is not. The visual system is tuned primarily to the intrinsic properties of objects, much less to an accidental, temporary property like illumination level (see also Anderson, this volume; Maloney et al., this volume) . The shading on a sculpture is instantly absorbed in the creation of a 3D shape such that the luminance gradients across the object are scarcely noticed. It is natural that our perceptual system homes in on the essential features of the environment, not on the fleeting and fickle variations in illumination. Ironically however, this truth-seeking aspect of visual functioning may have blinded both Wallach and the classic theorists to the important problem posed by spatial illumination edges.
The preoccupation among students of lightness constancy by the temporal version of the problem for so long allowed relatively simplistic solutions to obscure the thornier aspects of the problem. As Arend (1994, p. 160 ) has clearly noted, "Lightness constancy over multipleilluminants in a single scene places much greater demands on candidate constancy models than does constancy in single-illuminant scenes."
In sum then, Wallach's ratio principle works fine when applied to reflectance edges but fails when applied to illuminance edges. Here we see one of several reasons why his ratio principle cannot be reduced to lateral inhibition: that neural mechanism is blind to the kind of edge. The visual system as a whole, however, cannot be blind to this distinction. If it were, lightness constancy would fail catastrophically. The problem of edge classification, then, cannot be ignored.
Koffka clearly recognized that luminance ratios at edges (which he called gradients) were critical to lightness, as can be seen in the first of two propositions he offered (Koffka, 1935, p. 248) : "(a) the qualities of perceived objects depend upon gradients of stimulation…" But his appreciation of the edge classification problem can be seen in his second proposition: "(b) not all gradients are equally effective as regards the appearance of a particular field part..." On the same page he presents the problem of edge classification in concrete terms: "...given two adjoining retinal areas of different stimulation, under what conditions will the corresponding parts of the behavioural (perceptual) field appear of different whiteness but equal [perceived illumination], when of different [perceived illumination] but equal whiteness? A complete answer to this question would probably supply the key to the complete theory of color perception in the broadest sense." (As before I have substituted the modern term "perceived illumination" for Koffka's equivalent term "brightness".) Although J. J. Gibson never worked substantially in lightness, Koffka's influence on him (presumably due to their decade of overlap at Smith College) can be seen in Gibson's (1966, p. 215) question, "Why is a change in color not regularly confused with a change in illumination?" If the discrimination of reflectance and illumination edges is so fundamental to lightness perception, how is it done? Although a complete answer has not yet been achieved, we can cite many revealing empirical findings. The first factor often mentioned is edge sharpness. Illumination boundaries typically contain a penumbra while reflectance boundaries are more typically sharp, stepwise changes.
In his famous spot-shadow experiment, Hering (1874 Hering ( /1964 ) created a cast shadow by suspending an object in front of a piece of white paper. The shadow was perceived as such, presumably due to its penumbra. However, when Hering painted a thick black line along the penumbra, the shadow was perceived as a dark gray stain or a painted region. His thick black line obscured the penumbra. The same phenomenon can be demonstrated without the black line, using slide projector. If a glass slide containing a small opaque disk glued to its center is placed in a slide projector and projected onto a large white wall, the disk will appear as a shadow when the projector is somewhat out of focus, but it will appear as a darker surface color when the projector is brought into focus. In the checker-block image by Adelson (2000) , shown in Figure 1 , for example, the edges within the two circles are equally sharp. Yet one is perceived as a reflectance edge while the other is perceived as an illuminance edge. If luminance edges contain crucial information about lightness and illumination, intersections where edges cross one another are especially informative. In terms of the relative luminance values in the four quadrants of an intersection, we find two basic patterns: ratio-invariant and difference-invariant (Gilchrist, et al, 1983) . When an illumination boundary crosses a reflectance boundary, a common pattern, the result is ratio-invariance. Although the change in illumination changes absolute values, it does not change the luminance ratio along the reflectance edge. The same is true along the illumination boundary; the luminance ratio is constant regardless of the reflectance on which it is projected. However, when two illumination edges cross each other, as when there are two or more light sources, the intersections show difference-invariance, not ratio invariance. Differenceinvariance is also found when the boundary of a veiling luminance intersects a more distant edge, regardless of its type.
Local vs remote ratios
A simple ratio theory puts the lightness of a target surface far too much at the mercy of its retinally adjacent (and perhaps accidental) neighbor. Several studies have demonstrated that the lightness of a target can change dramatically even when the target/background luminance ratio remains constant. Yarbus (1967) used a display similar to the simultaneous contrast pattern: two red target disks were placed on adjacent black and white backgrounds. As expected, the two disks appeared slightly different in lightness. He then made the boundaries of the black and white backgrounds disappear by retinally stabilizing them, causing the targets to appear to lie on a single homogenous field. This made the targets appear far more different in lightness even though the luminance ratio at the disk border did not change. The implication is that the lightness of the disk depends not only on the luminance ratio between the disk and its immediate background, but also upon the luminance ratio at the edge of the background.
In the famous Gelb (1929) effect, a black paper appears white when it is suspended in midair and illuminated by a spotlight. But it appears black as soon as a (real) white background is placed immediately behind the black paper within the spotlight. These phenomena seem ideally consistent with Wallach's ratio principle. However, in 1995 Cataliotti and Gilchrist published experiments on the Gelb effect in which they broke the perceptual change into a series of steps. They started with a black square in a spotlight. It appeared white. Then they added a dark gray square next to it, also in the spotlight. The new square (having a higher luminance) appeared completely white but caused the original square to darken to light gray. Then a middle gray square was added, and so on, until the display contained a row of 5 squares, all standing in the spotlight. Each time a new (and brighter) square was added it appeared white and caused the other squares to appear darker.
The goal was to test whether the darkening effect caused by the addition of a brighter member was a contrast effect based on lateral inhibition, or (as they suspected) an anchoring effect. Their test relied on the well-known fact that lateral inhibitory effects drop off precipitously with distance across the retina. The question was thus, when each brighter square is added, does it darken the adjacent square more than the others? In other words, as the novel brighter square moves farther away from the original square does its darkening effect on the original square weaken? The answer turned out to be "no". The darkening effect depended only on the degree to which each novel square raised the highest luminance in the row, not on its location. This implies that the darkening effect they found, in what has come to be called the staircase Gelb effect, is an anchoring phenomenon.
These results also demonstrate that luminance ratios between non-adjacent surfaces can determine lightness just as much as those between adjacent surfaces. This is intuitively reasonable. Land and McCann (1971) and Arend (1973) suggested that, if the retina encodes luminance ratios at edges, ratios between remote surfaces can be computed by mathematically integrating the series of edge ratios that lie along any path between the remote surfaces. Such an edge-integration would be consistent with the results reported by Yarbus (1967) , Arend et al (1971) , Gilchrist et al (1983) , and Cataliotti and Gilchrist (1995) .
Once again, an analysis by Koffka (1935, p. 248) shows his understanding of the role of remote luminance ratios, and an experiment by Koffka and Harrower (1931) demonstrated it empirically.
In light of subsequent physiological work, it seems likely that such an integration is achieved through spatial filtering -that is, through the integration of information from center-surround receptive fields of varying location and scale (Blakeslee and McCourt, 1999) .
Gestalt theory
The concept of perceptual organization is intimately associated with the Gestalt theorists (see Wagemans, this volume). They were the first to recognize the fundamental importance of this problem. Different theories had sought to explain the perceived size of an object. But Wertheimer realized that the very perception of an object at all is a perceptual achievement.
Long before the emergence of Gestalt Theory, it had become obvious that perception could not be explained by sensations associated with local stimulation. Hering (1874 Hering ( /1964 ) had written, "Seeing is not a matter of looking at light-waves as such, but of looking at external things mediated by these waves; the eye has to instruct us, not about the intensity or quality of the light coming from external objects at any one time, but about these objects themselves." But that shortcoming was conventionally addressed by assuming a cognitive modification of those sensations, typically based on prior experience. The Gestaltists forcefully rejected this duality of raw sensations and cognitive modification, arguing that perception is the product of a unitary process. Gelb (1929 , excerpted in Ellis, 1938 wrote: "Our visual world is not constructed by 'accessory' higher (central, psychological) processes from a stimulus-conditioned raw material of 'primary sensations' and sensation-complexes…" Köhler (1947, p. 103) wrote, "Our view will be that, instead of reacting to local stimuli by local and mutually independent events, the organism responds to the pattern of stimuli to which it is exposed; and that this answer is a unitary process, a functional whole which gives, in experience, a sensory scene rather than a mosaic of local sensations."
These Gestalt ideas did not fail on their own merits. Nor were they superseded by superior ideas. Rather, they were eclipsed by external factors, specifically the tragic events surrounding World War II. The Gestaltists were forced to flee. The center of the scientific world shifted to the United States, and its behaviorist hegemony. Gestalt thinking was seen as embarrassingly metaphysical, especially when compared to the promises of the new, non-mentalistic reductionism. But for the question of lightness perception, the decades that followed could be called the dark ages because the experiments were done in dark rooms and very little progress was made. It was in this context that Wallach presented his ratio theory. But while ratio theory may have been celebrated by the reductionists, it failed to reflect the rich insights that had been offered by the Gestaltists.
Illumination came only with the cognitive revolution of the late 1960s which legalized discussion of internal processes. Influenced by David Marr (1982) , artificial intelligence, and machine vision, lightness theorists began to think in terms of inverse optics. Perhaps the decomposition of the retinal image by the visual system is the mirror inverse of the manner in which the image is initially composed by the multiplication of reflectance and illumination.
Various image decomposition models were proposed. Bergström (1977) suggested that the pattern of reflected light is analyzed into common and relative components, analogous to Johansson's ingenious vector analysis of motion (see Giese, this volume; Herzog and Ögmen, this volume). Thus luminance variations in the image are attributed to changes in reflectance, illumination, and planarity. Adelson and Pentland (1996) offered a similar approach couched in a vivid metaphor whereby painters, lighting designers, and metal benders cooperate to produce any given image in the most economical way. Ekroll et al (2004) have provided additional evidence for an analysis into common and relative components in the chromatic domain. Barrow and Tenenbaum (1978) suggested that the retinal image can be treated as a multiple image composed of separate layers, which they called intrinsic images. Gilchrist proposed an intrinsic image approach in which luminance ratios at edges are encoded, classified as due to reflectance or illuminance, and integrated within each class to produce separate reflectance and illuminance maps (Gilchrist, 1979; Gilchrist et al, 1983) . and Blake (1985) offered similar approaches.
Decomposition models as Gestalt
Certainly by comparison with the sensory and cognitive theories that preceded them, the decomposition models were consistent with the spirit of Gestalt Theory. There was no initial raw sensory stage. The structure of the image, in particular the 3D structure, was recognized. There was a place for everything and everything was in its place. If a gradient of luminance was used for shape-from-shading in one map, it was not available to the reflectance map and reflectance was seen as homogeneous at that location. This kind of complementarity had been proposed earlier by Koffka (1935, p., 244) who suggested "the possibility that a combination of whiteness and [perceived illumination], possibly their product, is an invariant for a given local stimulation under a definite set of total conditions. If two equal proximal stimulations produce two surfaces of different whiteness, then these surfaces will also have different [perceived illuminations], the whiter one will be less, the blacker one more [brightly illuminated]." (substituting the modern phrase "perceived illumination" for Koffka's equivalent term "brightness") Later this was called the lightness-illumination invariance hypothesis by Japanese researchers working in the Gestalt tradition (Kozaki & Noguchi, 1976; Noguchi & Kozaki, 1985) . This view of lightness and perceived illumination as complementary can also be seen in Gelb's (1929 , excerpted from Ellis, 1938 ) comment that, "Severance of illumination and that which is illuminated and perception of a resistant and definitely coloured surface are two different expressions of one and the same fundamental process."
Two of the earliest inverse-optics theories were presented by Johansson (1950) and Metelli (1970) , both Gestalt theorists. Johansson proposed that retinal motions are decomposed into common and relative components, an analysis that is the mirror image of the initial synthesis of eye movements and hierarchically nested distal motions (see Giese, this volume; Herzog & Ögmen, this volume). Not surprisingly perhaps, the essential elements in Johansson's vector analysis can be found in Duncker's (1929) earlier concept of separation of systems. Musatti (1953) presented an account of color perception analogous to Johansson's model. Metelli proposed that color scission is just the inverse of color fusion (see Gerbino, this volume).
A new type of Gestalt theory based on frameworks and groups
In the 1990s a new approach to lightness began to emerge, based on frameworks and perceptual grouping. Two authors of decomposition models, Adelson (2000) and Gilchrist (Gilchrist et al, 1999) , began to move away from the inverse-optics approach. Adelson began to speak in terms of adaptive windows, sub-regions of the retinal image within which lightness is computed by comparing luminance values. He noted that these regions need to be large enough so that the highest luminance value can be assumed to be white with reasonable probability but small enough so that the window does not include regions of very different illumination level. He also spoke about atmospheres, which incorporate not only high and low levels of illumination, but also regions of fog, and both veil (additive light) and filter components of transparent regions.
Gilchrist's anchoring theory (Gilchrist et al, 1999; Gilchrist, 2006) was couched in terms of frameworks. The term framework, short for frame of reference, owes the most to the thinking of Duncker (1929) and Koffka (1935) , who invoked the concept so persuasively, especially to motion perception. Just as the perception of any absolute motion in the visual field depends on the perceptual frame of reference to which the motion belongs, so the lightness of a given surface luminance depends on the frame of reference within which it is embedded. Intuitively a framework is a field of illumination, as used by Katz (1935) . However, a framework need not coincide with a field of illumination, as we will see.
Within each framework the lightness of a target is computed by multiplying the luminance ratio between that target and the highest luminance in the framework by the reflectance of white (90%). However, in complex images, any target surface is a member of at least one such local framework and a global framework composed of the entire visual field. The final perceived value is based on a weighted average of local and global values. This weighted average is closely related to the earlier concept of co-determination, proposed by Kardos (1934) who suggested that lightness is computed in relation to both relevant and foreign fields of illumination.
Subsequently, Bressan (2001 Bressan ( , 2006a Bressan ( , 2006b Bressan ( , 2007 published a modified anchoring theory that she calls double anchoring theory. Accepting the concept of co-determination, and the notion of anchoring to the highest luminance, Bressan adds a second anchoring principle by which the surround of any target is treated as white.
The rise of mid-level theories
This shift from layers to frameworks in turn was part of a larger trend -the emergence of midlevel models. Modern theories of lightness can be classified as low-level, high-level, or mid-level. Low-level theories emphasize the role of peripheral sensory mechanisms. These theories go back to Hering (1874 Hering ( /1964 , who attributed what he called "approximate constancy" to pupil size, sensory adaptation, and lateral inhibition. Theories in this tradition (Jameson & Hurvich, 1964; Cornsweet, 1970) have primarily focused on lateral inhibition. These theories have been called structure blind because they rely on local processes. Photoreceptors that engage in mutual inhibition, for example, are not conditioned by whether they exist at a reflectance edge or an illuminance edge. High-level theories generally derive from von Helmholtz (1866 Helmholtz ( /1924 . They portray lightness processing as cognitive, or thought-like.
Mid-level theories respond to the structure of the visual field without a high-level cognitive component. The world is represented more sparsely than in the decomposition models, consistent with change blindness work that began to appear about the same time (Simons & Levine, 1997) . Mid-level models are more rough and ready. They feature shortcuts. As Adelson (2000, p 344 ) has commented, the Helmholtzian approach is overkill (see also Koenderink, this volume, chapter on Gestalts as ecological templates). And whereas the decomposition models are concerned primarily with constancy, mid-level models give substantial attention to lightness illusions and failures of constancy. In the same spirit, Singh and Anderson (2002) offered a midlevel account of perceived transparency that has proven to account for the empirical data better than Metelli's (1974) classic inverse-optics approach.
It is debatable whether the decomposition models should be considered high-level or mid-level. Although they are often treated as high-level, the decomposition models do not require a cognitive component. There are no raw sensations and there is no appeal to past experience. On the other hand, the decomposition models posit a very complete representation of the world.
Frameworks as perceptual groups
A framework can be thought of as a perceptual group, and it is subject to the usual Gestalt laws of grouping. But in this grouping, regions of the image are grouped by common illumination. This use of the term grouping is somewhat unusual and requires some background.
Two kinds of grouping
Typically, Gestalt grouping principles have been invoked to organize the retinal mosaic into discrete objects (see Brooks, this volume). In the famous words of Wertheimer (excerpted in Ellis, 1938, p. 71) : "I stand at the window and see a house, trees, sky. And I could, then, on theoretical grounds, try to sum up: there are 327 brightnesses (and tones of color). (Have I "327"? No: sky, house, trees; and no one can realize the having of the "327" as such.)" Thus as Bressan (2001 Bressan ( , 2007 has noted, we can make a distinction between two kinds of grouping, (1) the traditional kind which involves the segregation of objects out of an indifferent retinal mosaic, and (2) the grouping of surfaces standing in the same illumination level. The first might roughly be called grouping by reflectance, the second, grouping by illumination. These are illustrated in Figure 2 . Grouping regions A and C together supports the perception of a square white napkin while grouping regions A and B (and also C and D) supports the computation of surface lightness values. 
8.2.Grouping by illumination
In fact, Koffka (1935, p. 246) hinted at just such a grouping by illumination. Using the term appurtenance as a synonym for belongingness, Koffka wrote, "a field part x is determined in its appearance by its "appurtenance" to other field parts. The more x belongs to the field part y, the more will its whiteness be determined by the gradient xy, and the less it belongs to the part z, the less will its whiteness depend on the gradient xz." When Koffka suggests that the whiteness (lightness) of a surface depends on the luminance ratio between that surface and other surfaces to which it belongs, he is talking about surfaces that lie in the same field of illumination.
8.3.Grouping by planarity
Gilchrist's findings on coplanar ratios can be thought of as grouping by planarity. In a chapter called "In defense of unconscious inference" Irvin Rock (1977) sought to offer a Helmholtzian account of those findings, writing, "When regions of differing luminance are phenomenally localized in one plane, the perceptual system operates on the assumption that they are receiving equal illumination." (Rock 1977, page 359) But this too was anticipated by Koffka (1935, p. 246 ) who wrote, "Which field parts belong together, and how strong the degree of this belonging together is, depends upon factors of space organization. Clearly, two parts at the same apparent distance will, ceteris paribus, belong more closely together than field parts organized in different planes."
In the Gilchrist (1980) experiments, depth perception allowed the visual system to organize retinal patches into perceived planes. The surfaces within each plane, as is often the case, shared a common illumination level. However, for purposes of lightness computation, which is more fundamental, grouping by planarity or grouping by illumination? Radonjid and Gilchrist (submitted) have recently teased these factors apart. They replicated Gilchrist's (1980) earlier experiments involving dihedral planes but with one change. One of the two planes was further divided into two fields of illumination by an illumination boundary. In this case, the lightness of the critical target was determined, not by the highest luminance in that plane, but by the highest luminance within the same region of illumination (which comprised only part of that plane).
Grouping by illumination makes sense. Von Helmholtz had glibly suggested that, to compute lightness, the visual system must take the illumination level into account. But specifying how this might be done is another matter. Von Helmholtz never did. Boyaci et al (2003) and Ripamonti et al (2004) have proposed that the visual system takes into account the direction and intensity of the light source, using cues like cast shadows, attached shadows, and glossy highlights (Boyaci et al, 2006) . Such a hypothesized process, however, would be computationally very expensive, and perhaps impossible in the real world. There is virtually never only a single light source. Consider your immediate environment as you read this. How many light sources are there? Remember that you must include any windows. And remember that every surface reflects light onto other surfaces.
Illumination level not needed
But it turns out that there is a much simpler approach. The visual system doesn't need to know the actual amount of illumination; it only needs to know which patches are getting the same level of illumination. Comparing the luminances of retinal patches grouped by illumination level is not only simpler computationally than comparing the luminance of a patch to some estimate of illumination level, but it is also more consistent with the empirical data (Gilchrist, 2006) . And this is where the grouping principles prove their worth.
Grouping principles work for both types of grouping
The parallel between the classic notion of grouping (for object formation) and this more novel kind of grouping by illumination is striking. Most of the classic grouping principles have already been shown to be effective in grouping by illumination, although the authors of those experiments did not think about their results in this way.
Grouping by proximity
Studies of the so-called brightness induction effect of a brighter "inducing field" on a darker "test field" were reported by Cole and Diamond (1971) , Dunn and Leibowitz (1961) , Fry and Alpern (1953) , and Leibowitz, Mote and Thurlow (1953) . All found that, with luminances held constant, the perceived brightness (and presumably lightness) of the darker test field decreases as the separation between the two is reduced. Although they attributed this result to spatial function of lateral inhibition, it perfectly satisfies Koffka's claim that "The more x belongs to the field part y, the more will its whiteness be determined by the gradient xy…" McCann and Savoy (1991) and Newson (1958) found the same results testing lightness explicitly, but without attribution to lateral inhibition. Gogel and Mershon (1969) showed that changes in depth proximity (rather than lateral proximity) produce the same effect on lightness. Their result cannot be attributed to lateral inhibition.
It is important to note that these test and inducing fields were either floating in midair, or presented against a totally dark background. When the fields are connected by a continuous series of coplanar patches (as in Cataliotti & Gilchrist, 1995) , little or no such proximity effect is found, presumably because they are already strongly organized as a group of patches. Laurinen, Olzak, and Peromaa (1997) superimposed shallow luminance modulations on each of the four parts of the simultaneous contrast display, as shown in Figure 3 . They found that the contrast effect is substantially weakened if the modulation frequency on each target is different from that of its background. Bonato et al (2003) also found this result by varying the type of texture rather than the scale. Conversely, the contrast effect can be strengthened by giving one target and its background one frequency (or texture), while giving the other target and its background a different frequency. Color can also be used to modulate similarity among regions of the contrast display without altering relative luminance. Olkkonen et al (2002) found that when both targets share a common color and the two backgrounds share a different color, the illusion is reduced. In grouping terms, increasing the belongingness of each target and its immediate surround, while simultaneously decreasing the belongingness between the two surrounds tends to produce local lightness computations within each surround, thus enhancing the perceived difference between targets. However, increasing the belongingness between the two surrounds promotes a more global computation within the whole pattern, and this reduces the contrast effect. Agostini and Proffitt (1993) have shown that a gray disk that moves together with a group of white disks appears darker than an identical gray disk that moves together with a group of black disks, even though all disks are seen against a common blue background. Bressan (2007) argues that while common fate is a strong grouping principle for object formation, it is a weak factor for grouping by illumination. 
Grouping by similarity

Grouping by common fate
Simultaneous lightness contrast as a grouping phenomenon
There is by now a good deal of evidence that a gray target on a black background appears lighter than an identical gray target on a white background, not because of retinal adjacency, but because of belongingness. This was first shown by Wertheimer and Benary in 1924 , using the image shown in Figure 3 . Even though the two triangles have identical adjacent luminances, the upper triangle appears slightly darker, presumably because it appears to belong to the white background. The lower triangle appears lighter because it appears to belong to the black cross.
In 1979, Michael White introduced an illusion that now bears his name. While the Benary effect is weaker than the standard simultaneous contrast effect, White's illusion is much stronger (see Figure 3) . Moreover, the effect is counter to that suggested by adjacency, given that the gray bars that appear lighter actually share more boundary length with white than with black. This asymmetry is pushed even farther in the Todorovid illusion (Todorovid, 1997).
The role of T-junctions
These illusions not only suggest that simultaneous contrast should be viewed as a grouping phenomenon, but they further reveal the critical grouping function of T-junctions. T-junctions appear to strengthen the perceptual grouping of the two regions that meet across the stem of the T, while weakening the grouping between those regions and the third region above the top of the T. 
Reverse contrast illusions
The divergence of adjacency and belongingness reaches its logical conclusion in the three reverse contrast illusions shown in Figure 4 (Bressan, 2001 Galmonte, 2002, Economou et al, 2007) . In each case the lightness difference between the identical gray targets runs exactly counter to what should happen according to the traditional inhibition explanation, and the illusion is produced by creating a perceptual group that rivals the immediate background of each of the targets.
Economou and Gilchrist reasoned that if the grouping interpretation of his reverse contrast effect is correct, it should be possible to vary the strength of the lightness illusion merely by varying the grouping factors that support the perception of the group of bars. Thus, in a forthcoming paper, Economou and Gilchrist report that illusion strength does indeed vary predictably with variations in the (1) proximity of the flanking bars, (2) shape similarity of target and flanking bars, (3) orientation similarity of target and flanking bars, and the (4) good continuation of the flanking bar ends.
In a further set of experiments Economou and Gilchrist varied the depth position of the various elements in order to vary the depth proximity between the target bars and their would-be partners: the flanking bars and the white and black backgrounds. The reverse contrast illusion was strongest when the target and flanking bars were perceived to lie in one plane while the white and black backgrounds were perceived to lie in a more distant plane. Conversely, the illusion was weakest when the target bars and white and black backgrounds were perceived to lie in the same plane while the flanking bars were perceived to lie in a separate, nearer plane.
Segmentation vs grouping
Organizing retinal patches into regions of common illumination is the equivalent of segmenting the retinal image by illumination level. Segmentation is thus the flip-side of grouping, and it is equivalent to edge classification. According to Kardos (1934) the main factors in segmentation are depth boundaries (corners and occlusion boundaries) and penumbrae.
Frameworks that create illusions
Although the framework concept in lightness goes back to the Katz notion of field of illumination, many frameworks do not coincide with regions of illumination. The black and white backgrounds of the simultaneous contrast display, for example, do not represent two levels of illumination. Yet they seem to function like frameworks of illumination, to a limited degree. Does this make sense? I believe it is inevitable. Fields of illumination are not perceived that way just because they are actually fields of illumination. The perception of a field of illumination must be based on certain cues, such as penumbra. However, those cues can occur in the absence of a field of illumination. When that happens, it appears that those cues create weak frameworks. The white and black backgrounds in simultaneous contrast have perimeters of consistent, continuous sign, much like spotlights and shadows. Perhaps for this reason they function as weak frameworks, approximately six times weaker than regions of equal size and luminance that are actually perceived to differ in illumination, according to edge substitution experiments (Gilchrist et al, 1983; Gilchrist, 1988) .
Thus when the boundary between the black and white backgrounds is replaced by a luminance ramp (penumbra), the contrast illusion is significantly enhanced (Shapley, 1986) .
Is reverse contrast an example of assimilation?
White's illusion is often presented as an example of assimilation. However, the examples shown in Figure 5 , created by Bart Anderson (1997) show that this construction does not work. The inequality signs indicate whether the target bars on the left should appear lighter or darker than those on the right, according to an assimilation account, which is directly contradicted by simple observation. 
Contrast vs. assimilation: not Gestalt concepts
There have been repeated attempts to organize these various lightness illusions by treating contrast and assimilation as opposing processes. First, it should be noted that contrast and assimilation are not Gestalt concepts. So-called contrast effects, as I have tried to show, were interpreted by the Gestaltists as matters of belongingness. Indeed Koffka (1935, p. 245) explicitly rejected Hering's contrast theory because it "…implies an explanation not in terms of gradient, but in terms of absolute amounts of light." Nor was assimilation proposed by the Gestaltists. While Musatti (1953) , clearly a Gestaltist, did employ the term assimilation, it appears that he meant by it something analogous to Bergström's (1977) notion of a common component.
Second, attempts to define the conditions under which either contrast or assimilation occurs have been made by Helson (1964) , Beck (1966 ), Festinger et al (1970 , Jameson and Hurvich (1989) , Shapley and Reid (1985) , Agostini and Galmonte (2000) , and Bindman and Chubb (2004) . There is a total lack of consensus; each of these suggestions is different from all the others.
Frameworks vs layers -two Gestalt approaches
In the modern era of lightness research, the challenge of perceptual organization has primarily been confronted by two classes of lightness theory: decomposition models and anchoring models. Decomposition models include those of Barrow and Tenenbaum, Gilchrist, Bergström, and Adelson and Pentland. The central idea is that the retinal image is parsed into two overlapping layers: a pattern of illumination superimposed over a pattern of surface reflectance. According to the anchoring model of Gilchrist (2006) , following Kardos (1934) and Koffka (1935) , the image is parsed into frameworks of illumination that are typically adjacent, like countries on a map. Empirical support for both frameworks and layers exists. Although the relative merits of frameworks and layers are debated (see Anderson & Winawer, 2008) , these contending approaches may ultimately turn out to be aspects of a single Gestalt account. But the outlines of such an integration are not obvious at present because the components into which the image is parsed, layers versus frameworks, seem so qualitatively different. Nevertheless, Bressan (2006a) has proposed the concept of the overlay framework, in which a layer is also a framework.
Conclusions
There is as yet no consensus on how surface lightness is computed by the brain. The fundamental problem is that any luminance can come from any reflectance. Thus the problem can only be solved using the surrounding context. Simply using the luminance ratio between a target surface and its background is woefully inadequate. The lightness of a surface has been shown to depend on many aspects of the perceptual structure of the image, including perceived 3D arrangement, classification of edges, and long-distance luminance relationships. These problems of perceptual organization have been confronted mainly by either parsing the image into overlapping layers representing illumination and reflectance or into frameworks within which lightness is computed by comparing luminances. It is hoped that further research will lead to models that incorporate the strengths of both approaches.
